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Customs Law
MATTHEW T. McGRATH, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AND ROBERT A. SHAPIRO
A number of significant developments have taken place in international trade law over the
past twelve months; only some of the most important changes will be touched on here in the
areas of regulations, judicial, and World Trade Organization decisions.
I. Summary of Custom's Regulatory Initiatives for 1996
The most important regulatory developments in customs law for 1996 concern the formula-
tion and development of regulations to implement the Customs Modernization Act (Mod
Act).' Few final regulations were published but, in an effort to generate discussion and industry
input as to the effectiveness and the language for the anticipated regulations, the agency published
several documents on the Customs Electronic Bulletin Board (CEBB) and invited comment
and suggestions for improvement.
A. THE REASONABLE CARE STANDARD 2
On January 22, 1996, Customs published on the CEBB a discussion draft to encourage
comments regarding agency interpretation of the Mod Act's directive that an importer use
reasonable care in connection with its importing operations.' This document included four
alternative proposals that may be implemented, if at all, together or separately. The proposals
included changes to 19 C.F.R. § 141, the publication of position statements in the Customs
bulletin, the publication of a reasonable care checklist, and the publication of case analyses as
examples of reasonable care. It is anticipated that the regulations, when promulgated, will draw
largely from the alternatives enumerated here and any comments on these suggestions. As a
matter of law, the failure to exercise reasonable care constitutes negligence under 19 U.S.C.
Matthew T. McGrath, Lawrence M. Friedman, and Robert A. Shapiro are members of the firm of Barnes,
Richardson & Colbum in Washington D.C.
1. See Tide VI of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. No. 103-182),
December 8, 1993.
2. The Customs Electronic Bulletin Board can be accessed by any computer. The telephone number is (703)
440-6155. Additionally, much of this information is available on the U.S. Customs Service Home Page (visited
January 22, 1996, <http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/> [hereinafter CEBB].
3. Id. MA-CAREI.TXT.
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§ 1592. However, as a matter of policy, Customs could consider alternatives to penalty
enforcement action such as counseling and compliance programs.
Several core concepts involved in the reasonable care standard are discernable from the
four proposals. It is clear that reasonable care places some burden on the Customs Service
to inform the trade community of the requirements for compliance. Customs states in this
discussion document that the following of an "Informed Compliance or other informational
publication..." demonstrates reasonable care until the publication is superseded, amended,
or supplemented.5 The failure to follow one of these publications "will generally constitute
the failure to exercise reasonable care."
The primary burden, however, remains with the importer. All of the proposals require the
importer to be familiar with the relevant statutes, regulations, rulings and interpretations, tariff
schedules (including interpretive and explanatory notes), judicial and administrative decisions,
as well as other publications. The importer must also be informed as to the terms of the import
transaction, the description, use, composition, and origin of the merchandise, and in certain
cases, the production steps which were performed on their merchandise prior to importation.
Customs also points out that gathering this knowledge is likely to require the coordination of
many departments of a large corporation. Finally, Customs must be provided with the informa-
tion necessary for them to determine whether the merchandise should be released from their
custody, the accuracy of the dedared value, dassification and rate of duty, as well as any other
requirements of law.
Importers who use a customs expert must still show that reasonable care was exercised. The
expert should be qualified to handle the importer's commodities or specific Customs issues.
Reasonable care also requires that all material facts be disclosed to the expert, and that in most
cases a written record be maintained.
Requesting a binding ruling is another example of reasonable care. Ruling requesters are
required to follow the ruling upon entry of merchandise covered, and identify the ruling on
the entry documentation. In return, Customs will, under most circumstances, liquidate the
entry in accordance with the ruling. Importers who have not requested the ruling but believe
that an existing published ruling covers the circumstances of their importation may choose to
follow the published ruling; however, the importer does so at its peril. If a party wishes to
follow one of several apparently conflicting rulings, reasonable care dictates that the party notify
Customs of the rulings which are being disregarded or distinguished, as well as the ruling being
followed.
B. RULINGS TO EXPIRE, MoRE INFORMATION REQUIRED UNDER DRAFT
CUSTOMS RULINGS REGULATION
The Customs Service issued draft proposed revisions to its administrative rulings regulations,
on the Customs Electronic Bulletin Board (CEBB),6 which would increase the documentation
requirements for ruling requests, and require the requester to certify that no other similar issue
is pending before any customs office or the courts. Also, under the proposal, unless an extension
is granted, rulings will automatically expire three years after issuance. The U.S. Customs Service
intends to process the comments it received in response to this draft before issuing a proposed
rule for publication in the Federal Register.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1996).
5. CEBB, supra note 2 at Position statement 6.
6. CEBB, supra note 2 at MA-177.EXE.
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C. PROPOSED CHANGES TO PENALTY PROCEDURES
The Customs Service has also issued discussion draft regulations regarding penalty procedures
and mitigation under 19 C.F.R. §§ 171, 172 in an effort to conform these rules to the Mod
Act and Customs' administrative reorganization plan.' Several components of this proposal
merit consideration at this time. First, Customs wishes to avoid running up against the statute
of limitations where a court may find a lower degree of culpability than originally alleged.
Under the proposal, therefore, Customs reserves the right to require a waiver of the statute
of limitations as a condition precedent before accepting a supplemental petition in any case
where the statute will be available as a defense to all or part of that case within one year from
the date of decision on the original petition for relief.
Second, in response to the decision in Trayco, Inc. v. United States,' where an importer was
allowed to pay a mitigated penalty under protest and later judicially challenge the applicable
degree of culpability, Customs proposes to refuse payments made under protest. Customs
proposes that any mitigation payment will act as an accord and satisfaction; the payment of
a mitigated penalty will serve as an election to resolve the case through the administrative
process, and the right to sue for a refund will be waived. If these changes remain in the final
rules, importers who dispute the amount of a mitigated penalty will be required to wait for
Customs to sue in the CIT for the entire unmitigated amount.
Third, Customs proposes to concurrently notify the principal and the surety of claims for
liquidated damages and penalties which are secured by a Customs bond. The petitioning period
will also run concurrently, but will be extended to allow for coordination between the parties.
D. PROPOSED RECORD-KEEPING REGULATIONS PLACE NEW BURDENS ON IMPORTERS
On March 5, 1996, Customs released a discussion draft of the regulatory amendments9
needed for the implementation of the recordkeeping requirements of the Mod Act.'0 The
proposal adds a new part to the regulations and expands the class of parties that are required
to retain Customs-related records. In addition to importers and their agents, the regulations
will apply to parties indirectly involved in importing including purchasing agents, designers,
carriers, cartmen, bonded warehouse proprietors, foreign trade zone operators, and drawback
claimants.
The records affected fall into two categories: (1) supporting records that relate to the informa-
tion on declarations provided to Customs, including "notes, worksheets, and other papers
necessary for reconstructing or understanding the records, including appropriate back-up proce-
dures," and (2) entry records, which are defined in a list published by Customs pursuant to
19 U.S.C. § 1509(a)(l)(A)."
All records must be retained in their original format unless alternative methods of storage
have been approved in writing. All record keepers must designate a Recordkeeping officer and
a stated backup officer. Written procedures, a description of the storage medium, effective
7. Id. at PART17I.TXT.
8. 944 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
9. CEBB, supra note 2 at MA-163.EXE (CEBB March 5, 1996).
10. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1508, 1509 (1996).
11. This is commonly referred to as the "(aX 1)(A) list." For an interim (aX IXA) list, see 61 Fed. Reg. 31,956
(1996). At the time of this writing, Customs has initiated a review of the (a)(I)XA) list. See CEBB, supra note 2
at MA-AIA.TXT (December 18, 1996).
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data transfer, storage, retrieval procedures, audit trail, self-surveillance, and other protections
must be built into the recordkeeping system.
Certified Recordkeeping agents are also allowed under the proposal. The proposal does not
spell out whether the use of a third party record keeper would reduce the liability of the
primary record keeper. Importers and others required to keep records under the proposal must
not assume that their customs broker will retain the records he is supposed to, even though
in practice, they could obtain missing records from the broker. Primary responsibility will
usually fall on the primary record keeper.
E. DRAFr PROTEST REGULATIONS ISSUED
The Customs Service also recently issued draft proposed revisions to its protest regulations. 2
Matters subject to protest now explicitly include notices of redelivery and reconciliation entries.
Additionally, the draft proposal clarifies the circumstances under which a Port Director may deny
an application for further review (AFR) without having to forward it to Customs Headquarters or
to the National Commodity Specialist Division. Allegations in an AFR that the protest decision
is inconsistent with an existing ruling or decision must be stated with particularity. Also, under
the proposal, the Port Director may request further review by Customs Headquarters or the
Director of the National Commodity Specialist Division.
If the Director of the National Commodity Specialist Division determines that an AFR
forwarded to him should be denied on substantive grounds, then the protest will be referred
to Customs Headquarters for a disposition. It is proposed that conferences will only be available
for decisions that Customs contemplates to be adverse to the protestant's position.
The proposed regulations dearly state that an importer must follow the protest decision
when making subsequent entries containing the same merchandise at all Customs field offices.
If a protest decision is received with respect to merchandise which is currently being entered,
the Customs field office handling the current entry must be notified. Failure to do so may
result in the rejection of current transactions and the imposition of penalties.
F. CUSTOMS ISSUES PRIOR DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS FOR COMMENT
Customs has published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking on new prior
disclosure regulations." Under section 1592,14 heavy penalties, in addition to the payment of
any unpaid duties, can be imposed on importers found violating the customs laws. The prior
disclosure statute provides an avenue of protection from these steep penalties by allowing a
person who violates a customs law to disclose it to Customs before, or without the knowledge
of, the commencement of a formal investigation. In return for this disclosure Customs may
reduce or eliminate the penalty.
The new regulations define "commencement of a formal investigation" as the date, recorded
in writing by Customs, when "facts and circumstances were discovered, or information was
received which caused Customs to believe" that a possible section 1592 violation occurred. 5
If an importer is denied the benefit of prior disclosure, and Customs initiates a formal investiga-
tion, then a copy of that writing must be forwarded to the importer.
12. Id. MA-174.EXE.
13. 61 Fed. Reg. 50,459 (1996).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1996).
15. 61 Fed. Reg. 50,459 (1996).
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Another significant proposed modification would give Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures (FP&F)
Officers leeway to defer investigations of unintentional violations until the disclosing party has
had the opportunity to fully explain the situation. The proposed regulation provides that the
disclosing party may request additional time to get information necessary to complete the
claimed prior disclosure before the matter is referred for investigation.
G. ORIGIN OF TEXTILE PRODUCTS CHANGES FROM SITE OF ASSEMBLY TO SITE OF CUTTING
On July 1, 1996, new rules took effect for determining the country of origin of a textile
or apparel product for purposes of customs duties and quotas (except for products from Israel).' 6
Substantial transformation or value-added are no longer factors for determining whether an
article originates in a particular country. Instead, five alternative rules of origin are applied. In
essence, the new rules result in origin being conferred in the country in which the pieces are
assembled rather than the country where fabric is cut.
The five rules are applied sequentially with each subsequent rule being applied only if the
origin can not be determined through the application of the preceding rule. The rules can be
summarized as follows:
1. Articles wholly produced in one country originate in that country.
2. Origin is conferred in the country in which each foreign material incorporated in the
product underwent an applicable change in tariff dassification.
3. (a) If "knit to shape" in one country, it originates in that country.
(b) Most articles originate in the country where they are "wholly assembled.""
4. For multi-country processing or assembly, origin is conferred in the country where the
most important assembly or manufacturing process occurred.' 8
5. Origin is conferred in the last country where an important assembly or manufacturing
process occurred.' 9
H. GSP RENEWED RETROACTIVELY
Congress reauthorized the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program on August 2,
1996.' 0 The new legislation, in addition to extending the program through May 31, 1997,
makes several substantive changes to the prior law. First, it reduces the competitive need limit
for imported products and alters the annual increase scheme from an indexed measure to an
absolute one. Second, it grants the president explicit discretion in designating least developing
country eligible products, limited only to non-statutorily exempt, non-import sensitive articles.
Finally, it postpones for three years from denial the reconsideration of an article for eligibility.
Duty-free treatment was reinstated on GSP-eligible products on October 1, 1996. All duty-free
articles imported after December 31, 1995, but before October 1, 1996 (1996 entries), are
16. 19 C.F.R. § 102.21 (1996).
17. "Wholly assembled" means that there must be at least two preexisting components in essentially the
same condition as found in the finished good that have been combined to form the finished good in a single country,
territory, or insular possession. Exduded from this definition are minor attachments or minor embellishments not
appreciably affecting the identify of the good, and minor subassemblies that will not affect the status of a good
as being "wholly assembled." Wbat Every Member of tbe Trade Community Sbould Know About: Textik 6 Apparel
Rules of Origin (U.S. Customs Service, 1996).
18. Unfortunately, Customs has thus far declined to explain this very important concept in detail, opting
instead for a case-by-case determination. Id.
19. Again, Customs has not defined this concept but will make determinations on a case-by-case basis. Id.
20. HR. 3448, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
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eligible for refunds. Refunds will be subject to interest payments calculated from the dates of
deposit of estimated duties and based on quarterly IRS interest rates.
Passage of the reauthorizing legislation also resulted in the graduation of Malaysia from the
GSP program,2 the removal of certain products from Pakistan on account of human-rights
violations, and the relief of some de minimis products from the application of competitive need
limits pursuant to decisions announced last November.
The USTR has resumed the reviews of the beneficiary countries' practices with respect to
labor and intellectual property as well as the eligible products. It plans to complete these reviews
by May, and will not conduct any reviews for 1996 due to its constraint in resources.
II. Judicial Developments in International Trade
A. THE HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX
This year, the U.S. Court of International Trade (USCIT) had the opportunity to clarify
three issues remaining from its 1995 decision, U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States,2 in which
it held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) imposed under 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461-62
(1988 & Supp. v. 1993)2" is an unconstitutional tax on exports. First, the Court reviewed
whether U.S. Sboe appropriately awarded a refund of the tax "together with interest and
costs as provided by law. ' 2 4 The Court recognized that without express congressional
consent, the United States is immune from an award of interest"' to a successful plaintiff,
but agreed with the plaintiff and amici that this immunity was expressly waived by the
statute. The Court found that while the HMT statute provides for the treatment of the
tax as a duty for purposes of administration and enforcement,26 this clause serves to establish
the agency responsible for collecting and processing HMT payments rather than to immunize
the government from interest awards for overpayments. Since the payment of a money
judgment based on the unconstitutionality of the tax is not related to the administration
and enforcement of the tax, the statutory provision providing that "[iln any judgment of
any court rendered (whether against the United States, . . .) for any overpayment in respect of
any internal-revenue tax, interest shall be allowed...27 specifically waives the government's
immunity from such interest payment."
Second, the court decided that it would be inappropriate to certify a class of HMT daimants
under USCIT rule 23.29 Looking to the requirements of Rule 23(a),30 the Court found the
21. Effective January I, 1997.
22. 907 F. Supp. 408 (1995).
23. The tax is imposed under 26 U.S.C.A. § 4461 (1989 & Supp. 1996). The statute provides for a "tax
on any port use" in the amount of 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo involved.
24. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 924 F. Supp. 1191 (1995).
25. Citing, Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986).
26. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4462 (1989).
27. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (1995).
28. US. Shoe, No. 94-11-00668, 1996 WL61643, at #1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 7, 1996).
29. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 794 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
30. U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade Rule 23(a) provides;
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade, Rule 23(a) (1997) [hereinafter USCIT].
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prerequisites to class certification had been met,3' but that "the real point of debate" is whether,
as an exercise of discretion, the Court should grant the motion. 2 In light of the decision in
US. Shoe, the pending appeal to the Federal Circuit, and the stays pending appeal, the Court
found it unlikely that conflicting decisions would arise. In addition, the Court was not concerned
about limited funds from which to fashion a remedy. Therefore, class certification under Rule
2 3(b)(1) was inappropriate." Similarly, Rule 2 3(b)(2), relating to injunctive or declaratory relief,
was inappropriate in light of the fact that the Court had already granted injunctive relief that
should prevent the government from collecting the unconstitutional tax if the Court of Appeals
affirms the decision. Moreover, the Court expressed concern about applying Rule 2 3(b)(2) to
certify an all-inclusive class that would not permit claimants to opt out since the case now
turns only on the availability of money damages rather than injunctive relief.
Finally, turning to Rule 2 3(b)(3), the Court readily accepted that common issues of law and
fact predominate, but in applying the Rule's four subfactors, 4 the court refused to accept that
a class action would be superior to other avenues available.' First, the Court found that the
larger claimants would likely opt out of the class while smaller claimants have no interest in
controlling individual actions. 6 Second, the Court found that the litigation on the merits had
progressed to the appellate stage and the resolution of the test case would resolve all of the
filed claims.' 7 Third, Congress had already granted jurisdiction to the USCIT, s thus negating
the need for another method of concentrating the HMT actions to a single forum. Finally,
the Court found that a class action would not aid in the resolution of individual cases involving
discovery questions and the amount of recovery. 9
The Court then turned to a discussion of whether, as a matter or policy, it should impose
a class action to protect small claimants who would not otherwise bring an action against the
government, or whether to require these parties to bring individual cases using the USCIT's
unique test case and suspension procedure. On balance, the Court found that the procedures
31. The proposed class would encompass all persons who have paid the HMT with respect to exports. The
total number of cases involving the HMT pending before several courts is greater than 1,000 with individual
claims ranging from less than $100 to hundreds of thousands of dollars.
32. Baxter, 925 F. Supp. at 797.
33. USCIT Rule 23(b)(1) provides that a class action may be maintained where, in addition to the prerequisites
discussed at note 24, supra:
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create
a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter
be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests .
USCIT, supra note 28 at 23(b)(1).
34. USCIT Rule 2 3(bX3)(A)-(D) specifies that
The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
USCIT, supra note 28 at 2 3(b)(3)(A)-(D).
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already undertaken to manage the litigation have functioned efficiently and that there was little
advantage in certifying a class. In addition, the Court stated that Congress could decide to
implement a process to permit small claimants a means of recovering the taxes they paid. As
a result, the Court denied the motion for certification.'
The third HMT case decided by the USCIT determined that the unconstitutionality of the
HMT as applied to exports does not render the tax unconstitutional with respect to imports.4"
The Court framed its analysis on the test set out in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock." First, the
USCIT found that the import and export aspects of the HMT are fully capable of independent
operation." Then, applying the second part of the Alaska Airlines test, the Court examined
whether the Congress would have enacted the legislation without the flawed provision." The
Court pointed to an express severability clause in the statute as evidence that Congress did
not want the invalidity of one provision of the statute to affect any other provision." The
Court also looked to the legislative history of the HMT law which expressly discussed the
possibility that the HMT may be unconstitutional as applied to exports and sought to preserve
the remainder of the Act." Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that it should
read the severability clause as preserving the remaining portions of the Water Resources Develop-
ment Act in the event the HMT is invalid but not as applying to the HMT on imports where
the tax on exports is invalid.47
The saga of the HMT now moves to the Federal Circuit where the decision will be guided
by the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in United States v. International Business Macbines Corp.
48
The Supreme Court found that a federal tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers
that are not subject to federal income taxes49 violated the Export Clause. Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court in a six to two decision, found that the Export Clause prohibits nondiscrimi-
natory federal taxes on goods in export transit."0 This decision obviously enhances the likelihood
that the Federal Circuit will uphold the USCIT's determination that the HMT is an unconstitu-
tional tax on exports.
B. JUDICIAL BURDENS
Another recurring issue in 1996 has been the correct application of the presumption of
correctness that applies to Customs Service decisions. The genesis for this controversy was the
Federal Circuit's 1995 decision in Goodman Manufacturing, LP. v. United States. t In Goodman
the plaintiff sought a ruling from Customs on the proper accounting for recoverable and
40. Id. at 799-800.
41. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 1570 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
42. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
43. Carnival, 929 F. Supp. at 1572-73.
44. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684-86.
45. Carnival, 929 F. Supp. at 1574.
46. Id. at 1575-77.
47. Id. at 1573, 1576.
48. United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1793; 135 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1996).
49. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4371 (1989 & Supp. 1996).
50. The Court did not address the basic question of whether the assessment of a tax on insurance premiums
"is so closely connected to the goods as to amount to a tax on the goods themselves .. " IBM, 135 L. Ed. 2d
at 136, and instead relied on Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915), for the
proposition that the tax in question was a tax on the goods in export transit. Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg
dissented arguing that the Court should reconsider Thames d, Mersey and that the Court unnecessarily broadened
the scope of the question before it. Id.
51. Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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irrecoverable waste generated in the zone during production. Customs ruled that the value of
privileged foreign merchandise" entered from the zone does not indude the dutiable value of
recoverable waste." In its review of a motion for summary judgment, the USCIT held that
Customs' decision was entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 263 954 and
that Goodman had failed to overcome that presumption.55
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the USCIT had improperly merged two distinct
concepts: deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers and the
presumption that Customs' decisions have a proper basis in fact.56 The Court then held that
because no questions of fact were at issue, "the presumption of correctness is not relevant." 57
The Court went on to review Customs' statutory interpretation based upon the two-part
deference test of Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."6 In the end,
the Court found both Goodman's and Customs' interpretations to be at odds with the statutory
language and it reversed the USCIT.s5
This mid-course correction to Customs law set off something of a firestorm in the USCIT
that has burned throughout 1996. In E.M. Chemicals v. United States, ° Judge Wallach quoted
Goodman for the proposition that plaintiffs must overcome both the presumption of correctness
as to facts and the Court's deference to the agency's construction of the statute.61 Judge Newman
followed suit in Marcor Development Corp. v. United States;6 ' however, the Judge did not apply
the two-step Chevron approach and instead, under a de novo review, considered the common
and commercial meaning of the statutory term "fish.
' 63
Also this year, Judge Pogue thoroughly analyzed the application of Chevron to Customs
Service decisions in deciding a motion for summary judgment with respect to the classification
of cobalt alloy powders.64 Judge Pogue began his analysis by stating that classification cases
52. Privileged foreign merchandise is classified and valued upon entry into the commerce of the United States
as if it remained in the form in which it entered the foreign trade zone. 19 C.F.R. § 146.41(e) (1996). Thus,
if materials used to produce finished goods in a zone are subject to a lower rate of duty than the finished article,
it is advantageous to employ privileged foreign status.
53. Goodman, 69 F.3d at 507. See also HRL 544602 (Jul. 15, 1991).
54. The statute provides that:
[lI]n any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade under section 515, 516,
or 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the administering
authority, or the International Trade Commission is presumed to be correct. The Burden of
proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging the decision.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2639(aXI) (1994).
55. Goodman Mfg, L.P. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
56. Goodman, 69 F.3d at 508.
57. Id.
58. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Chevron
requires that the Court first determine whether Congress has spoken to a particular question. If the answer is
no, the Court asks whether the interpretation of the statute adopted by the agency is "permissible." The Courts
uphold permissible interpretations even where they would have adopted a different reading of the statute.
59. Goodman, 69 F.3d at 505.
60. E.M. Chemicals v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 202 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
61. Id. at 206.
62. Marcor Development Corp. v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1124 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). See, also,
GKD-USA, Inc. v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 875 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (Judge Tsoucalas taking a similar
approach to deciding motions for summary judgment).
63. Id. at 1128. The question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs shark cartilage food supplement
consists of twenty percent by weight of "fish." The government interpreted that term to apply only to the flesh
of the fish.
64. Anval Nyby Powder AB v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
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come to the Court for & novo review;65 the role of the Court is to find the correct classification"
even if that requires that the Court rely on information not before Customs at the time of
the original decision.
Turning to Chevron, Judge Pogue stated that in Semperit Indus. Prod., Inc. v. United States6'
the USCIT expressly rejected the application of Cbevron in classification cases and that this
position has been impliedly adopted by the Federal Circuit.68 Cbevron-style deference is incompat-
ible with the statutory requirement for de novo review and the Court's obligation to reach a
correct result; the Court should reject an incorrect dassification even if it is based on a permissible
interpretation of the statute."
The Court distinguished Goodman by finding that the Federal Circuit had not actually deferred
to Customs. Instead, according to Judge Pogue, the Federal Circuit mentioned Chevron but
actually reviewed the decision de novo and reached the correct result. The result in Goodman,
therefore, was consistent with the USCIT's traditional approach to deference to Customs."°
The next important decision on this issue was Commercial Aluminum Cookware Co. v. United
States. " Here,Judge Carman took the Federal Circuit to task for failing to grant the presumption
of correctness to Customs' legal and factual determinations. The Judge based his conclusion
principally on the fact that the standard of review statute draws no distinction between facts
and law." Judge Carman also relied on Artbur v. Unkart" where the Supreme Court stated
that the "decisions" of an officer acting in the discharge of his duty are presumed correct.
Based on this and subsequent case law, Judge Carman applied the presumption of correctness
to all of the subsidiary decisions involved in the ultimate classification determination. This
includes Customs' legal analysis.'"
Finally, in Verosol USA, Inc. v. United States," Judge Pogue directly addressed Judge Carman's
analysis. Judge Pogue stated that the rule of Commercial Aluminum Cookware would require
plaintiffs to carry a burden of proof as to the law and would greatly reduce the role of the
USCIT in classification cases.' 6 Citing Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States," Judge Pogue held that
"[s]uch an approach would undermine the court's obligation to find 'the correct result, by
whatever procedure.' ""
In summary, Goodman opened the proverbial can of worms, and created significant dispute
as to the appropriate standard to be applied in the review of Customs decisions. At least one
panel of the Federal Circuit believes Customs Service decisions in classification and valuation
65. Id. at 466. See 28 U.S.C.A § 2640(a) (1994) (the court is to "make its determination upon the basis of
the record made before the court").
66. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2643(b) (1994).
67. Semperit Indus. Prod., Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1292, 1299-1300 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
68. Crystal Clear Indus. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1001, 1002 n.* (Fed. Cir. 1995) (the CAFC's affirming
the CIT "did not extend to the suggestion that a routine classification dispute is entitled to special deference
under Cbmm").
69. Semperit, 855 F. Supp. at 1300.
70. Anval Nyby Powder, 927 F. Supp. at 463.
71. Commercial Aluminum Cookware Co. v. United States, 938 F. Supp. 875 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
72. Id. at 880. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2639(aXI) (1994) ("the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the
administering authority, or the International Trade Commission is presumed to be correct").
73. Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877).
74. Cookware, 938 F. Supp. at 881-82.
75. Verosol USA, Inc. v. United States, 941 F. Supp 139 (Ct. In'tl Trade 1996).
76. Id. at 139.
77. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. ('T) 70, 75, rcbg denied, 2 Fed. Cir. (1) 97 (1984).
78. Verosol, 20 Ct. In'tl Trade at 141.
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cases are entided to Chevron-style judicial deference on questions of law. More traditionally,
these decisions would be reviewed de novo. Finally, the Federal Circuit and the majority of the
USCIT dearly believe the statutory presumption of correctness only attaches to Customs'
findings of fact."
It appears that the correct analysis is to treat the statute giving Customs the presumption
of correctness as part of the assignment of the burden of proof in a trial de novo." Without
an explicit statement of the presumption, it would be unclear whether, in the trial & novo, a
plaintiff has the burden of overcoming Customs' decision or Customs has the burden of proving
its decision to have been correct. This reading of the statute gives meaning to the agency's
decision while preserving the role of the CIT in & novo review. Once in Court, it remains the
duty of the trial judge to determine the correct dassification by whatever means are available.
This is, as the Court in Goodman recognized, completely separate from the question of deference
to the agency on issues of law.
C. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN MARKING RuLEs
A final interesting Customs case concerned Customs authority to implement country of
origin marking rules under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).9 ' CPC
International, Inc. planned to manufacture peanut butter in the United States from Canadian-
origin peanut slurry. In response to CPC's request for a ruling, Customs applied its NAFTA
marking rules for country of origin 2 and determined that the finished peanut butter must be
marked as a product of Canada. 3 The importer challenged Customs' determination on the
basis of their failure to apply the substantial transformation test under 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)
and as enunciated in United States v. Gibson-Tbomsen, Co., InC.
84
The Court held that nothing in the NAFTA implementation Act or the Statement of
Administrative Action suggests that Congress intended to amend the marking statute." Ac-
cording to judge Newman, Congress intended that Gibson-Tbomsen remain in effect "in addition
to and independent of the NAFTA marking rules.""' Thus, the proper role for the NAFTA
marking rules is that they be applied in addition to the substantial transformation test under
Gibson-Tbomsen. " The Court considered and dismissed Customs' argument that the tariff shift
based NAFTA marking rules are a codification of the existing law of substantial transformation."
In a strongly worded opinionjudge Newman held that by abrogatingthe substantial transforma-
tion test Customs exceeded its authority to promulgate regulations necessary to implement the
NAFTA. An appeal of this decision is anticipated.
79. H. REP. No. 1235, 96th CONG., 2d Sass. 59 (1980), reprinted in, 1980 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3729, 3770.
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(aXI) (1994).
81. CPC International, Inc. v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 1093 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
82. 19 C.F.R. Part 102 (1996).
83. Headquarters Ruling Letter 557,994 (Oct. 25, 1996). Customs did not address the issue of substantial
transformation in the traditional sense. Instead, Customs applied the hierarchy of rules set out in 19 C.F.R.
§ 102.11 to make an origin determination. Under these rules, Customs relied upon the fact that the peanut
slurry did not undergo a specified change in tariff classification. As a result, the peanut butter did not become
a product of the United States for purposes of marking.
84. United States v. Gibson-Thomsen, Inc. 27 CCPA 267, C.A.D. 98 (1940).
85. CPC Int'l, 933 F. Supp. at 1098.
86. Id. at 1102-03. As such, 19 C.F.R. § 134.35(a), which limits the Gibson-Tbosmn test to goods of
non-NAFTA countries, is contrary to congressional intent.
87. CPC Int'l, 933 F. Supp. at 1102.
88. Id. at 1104.
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D. RE iEw OF ANTIDUMPING CASES
Finally, one antidumping case decided by the court this year is worth mentioning. In Zenith
Electronics Corp. v. United States,89 the Federal Circuit reviewed the final results of an annual
review on the dumping of color televisions from Taiwan. Under the standard set out in Atlantic
Sugar, Ltd. v. United States,95 the Court reviewed the administrative record de novo to determine
whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support the agency determination.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader expressed concern regarding the value of having the
USCIT review these dumping orders when the Federal Circuit is going to review the same
record again applying the same standard. Judge Rader makes three main points. First, he argues
that Atlantic Sugar is based on a misapplication of the statute setting the standard of review
in the USCIT to the CAFC. The statute, he argues, dearly refers only to the USCIT; therefore
there is no legislative intent that the CAFC duplicate the efforts of the USCIT. Second, the
judge noted that prior to 1979, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) examined
the administrative record in dumping cases but expressly accorded some deference to the prior
review by the Customs Court. The CAFC may not apply the dearly erroneous standard,
however, because the USCIT does not make findings of fact in dumping cases, and instead
sits as an appellate body.
Third, according to Judge Rader, Supreme Court practice in other areas of administrative
law is different. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 1 the Supreme Court reviewed a decision
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which had direct review of NLRB decisions.
The D.C. Circuit was statutorily required to review the decision "on the record considered
on the whole." Upon its review, the Supreme Court stated:
Our power to review the correctness of an application of the present standard ought seldom to
be called into action. Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support
agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals.
The Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence]
standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.92
The Supreme Court clarified this standard by saying that it does "no more on the issue of
insubstantiality than decide that the Court of Appeal made a 'fair assessment' of the record.'"
Judge Rader then suggested that the Universal Camera standard should apply to the Federal
Circuit's review of dumping cases. This would give deference to the judicial body entrusted
by Congress with the review of trade cases, and give additional importance to the USCIT
judge's review of the record as his or her decision will be given the appropriate deference on
appeal. The Universal Camera standard would also eliminate appeals seeking nothing more than
a second review of the record and save judicial resources.
Ill. International Developments
A. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION APPELLATE PROCESS
The World Trade Organization (WTO) made two decisions this year that went through
the complete dispute settlement procedure culminating in appellate decisions. The first decision
89. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, Appeal No. 95-1455 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 1996), 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29147.
90. Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
91. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
92. Id. at 490-91.
93. Id.
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involved the implementation by the United States of the Clean Air Act (CAA).94 These regula-
tions required the refiners of gasoline to determine an individual baseline of pollutants in
accordance with the level contained in the gasoline they sold in 1990. Foreign refiners who
do not export seventy-five percent of their production to the United States, however, are
required, in most cases, to meet a statutorily determined level instead.
B. Two DEcisIONs
Venezuela and Brazil challenged the Gasoline Rule under the WTO Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding). 5
The panel had to determine whether this constituted discrimination against gasoline of foreign
production under Article III, and if so, whether it was permissible under Article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATI), which allows the contracting parties
to engage in activities "relating to the conservation of natural resources .. " A three-member
panel concluded that the Gasoline Rule violated the Article 111:4.96 Furthermore, while dean
air is an exhaustible natural resource, an Article XX(g) exception could not be justified because
the less favorable baseline for gasoline from foreign refiners was not "primarily aimed at" the
conservation of the natural resource."'
On appeal by the United States challenging only the panel's narrow interpretation of the Article
XX(g) exception, the Appellate Body found that the panel had erred in its Article XX(g) analysis.
The panel had incorrectly reviewed whether the less favorable treatment was "primarily aimed
at" the conservation of natural resources rather than deciding whether the measure, i.e. the baseline
establishment rules, were primarily aimed at conservation. Under this test, the Appellate body
held that the baseline establishment rules were indeed primarily aimed at conservation.9"
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body ruled that the Gasoline Rule did not comply with the
cbapeau of Article XX in that the baseline establishment rules constituted an "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries . . . or a disguised restriction on international
trade." 9 The Appellate Body concluded that the United States failed to consider other less
discriminatory means of achieving its dean air goals, and that this resulted in "discrimination
[that] must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable. " "
In the second appellate decision, Japan-Taxes on Alcobolic Beverages'' the Appellate Body
decided that the Japanese Liquor Tax Law did not conform with the requirements of Article
III of GATT.'02 In this decision, the Panel, and subsequently the Appellate Body, had to decide
if differences in the Japanese tax on shochu as opposed to other distilled beverages violated
the national treatment provisions of Article Ill.
Before deciding the substance of the Article III issue, however, the Appellate Body had to
first determine what effect to give to panel determinations under the pre-Uruguay Round
94. 40 C.F.R. 80.40-.130 (1995).
95. For the text of the WTO agreements cited herein, see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 208 (1994).
96. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (Jan.
29, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996).
97. Id. at para. 6.40.
98. WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 19, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
99. Article XX GAIT 1994
100. WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 28-9, reprinted in 35 l.L.M. 603, 632-3 (1996).
101. WT/DS8/AB/R October 4, 1996.
102. Done at Marrakesh, Morocco, April 15, 1994 and entered into effect on January 1, 1995.
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dispute settlement procedures. The Appellate Body held that the prior determinations do not
serve as subsequent practice and are not legally binding on the WTO system although they
may provide useful guidance and reasoning.
The Appellate Body then explained the nuances of GATT Article III:1 and Article 111:2.
At the heart of the substantive matter is the various standards that Artide III requires. Under
Artide 111:2 first sentence, any excess in taxation of an imported like product over that of the
domestic product is violative. The concept of like product, however, is narrowly construed.t '
Alternatively, Artide 111:2 second sentence applies to imported products that are "directly
competitive or substitutable" with the domestic product. In this case any dissimilar taxation
must not be "applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic production." 4
Finally, the Appellate Body held that the intent to protect the domestic industry is not
material to this analysis. "[A]pplied ... so as to afford protection..." refers to the effect of
the domestic legislation. This involves a multifactored analysis induding the tax differential,
the taxing methodology, and the substitutability of the products in an effort to determine
whether the dissimilarity in the taxing scheme has a trade distorting effect. Under this test,
the Appellate Body affirmed the holding of the panel and found that the Japanese liquor tax
violated GATT Artide III.
103. WT/DS8/AB/R at 23.
104. Id. at 24.
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